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This thesis examines the implications of China’s 
security needs for the modernization and role of the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the Indian Ocean.  
The main argument is that the expansion of China into a new 
maritime area of operation is likely to solidify Beijing’s 
current regional relationships and possibly lead to a naval 
arms buildup in the Indian Ocean region.  Although the 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review does not explicitly name China, 
its conclusion that a  “military competitor with a 
formidable resource base will emerge” in Asia clearly 
implies that the United States will have to take into 
account China’s aspirations to become a regional and 
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This thesis examines the implications of China’s security needs for the 
modernization and role of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the Indian 
Ocean.  The main argument is that the expansion of China into new maritime area of 
operation is likely to solidify current regional relationships and possibly lead to a naval 
arms buildup in the Indian Ocean region. 
Although the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review does not explicitly name China, 
the conclusion that a  “military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge” 
in Asia clearly implies that the United States will have to take into account China’s 
aspirations to become a regional and global maritime power in the 21st century. 
This thesis consists of five chapters.  Chapter Two examines the historical role of 
the PLAN from pre-revolution traditions to the navy modernized by Deng Xiaoping.  It 
contends that the role of the navy has played a rather small part in China’s history.   
Chapter Three examines how China’s neighbor India is linked to China’s security.  
PLAN advances into the region are analyzed to give a broader picture of Chinese foreign 
policy in the region.  Chapter Four looks at China’s current capacity of the PLAN and 
investigates its potential weaknesses.  The thesis concludes by assessing how the PLAN 
will play an increasingly important role in the calculus of Chinese national security in the 















This thesis examines the implications of China’s 
security needs for the modernization and role of the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the Indian Ocean.  
The main argument is that the expansion of China into a new 
maritime area of operation is likely to solidify current 
regional relationships and possibly lead to a naval arms 
buildup in the Indian Ocean region. 
The research for this project draws upon an assortment 
of both primary and secondary sources.  The latter 
includes: books, academic periodicals, internet resources, 
and conference papers relevant to the evolving security 
environment in the region. 
A.  U.S. INTERESTS IN THE REGION 
Although the terrorist attacks carried out against the 
United States on September 11th have created new coalitions 
and dialogue to fight the war on terror, there are still 
many issues that divide Beijing and Washington.   In the 
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) the “East Asian 
littoral—from the Bay of Bengal to the Sea of Japan—
represents a particularly challenging area” and maintains 
that Asia is “gradually emerging as a region susceptible to 
large-scale military competition.”1  Although the report 
does not explicitly name China, its conclusion that a  
“military competitor with a formidable resource base will 
emerge” clearly implies that the United States will have to 
take into account China’s aspirations to become a regional 
and global maritime power in the 21st century.   
 
                                                 
1 “Quadrennial Defense Review Report”, Department of Defense Puplication, September 30, 2001 available online 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf> 
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B.  CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis consists of five chapters.  Chapter Two 
examines the historical role of the PLAN from pre-
revolution traditions to the navy modernized by Deng 
Xiaoping.  It contends that the role of the navy has played 
a rather small part in China’s history.   
Chapter Three examines how China’s neighbor India is 
linked to China’s security.  PLAN advances into the region 
are analyzed to give a broader picture of Chinese foreign 
policy in the region.  The Chapter also assesses China’s 
past and future economic and energy needs in order to 
evaluate the significance of China’s current and potential 
future actions in the Indian Ocean.  Chapter Four looks at 
China’s current capacity of the PLAN and investigates its 
potential weaknesses. 
Understanding Beijing’s motivations for modernizing 
the PLA and its navy in particular is not a simple issue.  
The thesis concludes by assessing how the PLAN will play an 
increasingly important role in the calculus of Chinese 
national security in the 21st century and examining the 
implications for U.S. policy in the area.   
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II.  PLAN HISTORICAL ROLE 
A.  NAVAL TRADITIONS THROUGH 1949 
The PLAN began on the limited navy-building efforts of 
the ROC regime.  In the early 20th century, the Kuomintang 
began to build a naval fleet.  However, in the 1930s, Japan 
occupied the majority of China’s coastal ports and 
shipyards and trapped both the Chinese Nationalists and 
Communists deep in the interior.2  Between 1945 and 1949, 
China received 271 World War II surplus ships from the 
United States.3  The U.S. Military Assistance Group in China 
advised the KMT on how to employ the navy in modern 
warfare, but the military was solely interested in pursuing 
its land-based civil war with the Communists.  As in 
China’s long past, the naval aspect of war in China was 
minimal. 
In December 1948, the Communists cut off the 
Nationalists at Qingdao and left the ROC navy isolated.  
Nationalist forces disassembled the base and evacuated to 
Taiwan.  As the Kuomintang fortunes declined in the 
campaigns on the water and on land, the navy was more 
frequently called upon to aid in retreats.4  Over the next 
year, the ROC navy was engaged almost entirely in 
transporting more than 600,000 military personnel and two 
million civilians from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan.5 
The entire ROC navy did not completely evacuate to 
Taiwan.  In the beginning therefore, the PLA Navy was 
comprised mainly of ships that were captured or defected 
from the Nationalists.  Apart from the ships, some former 
Nationalist forces also defected with their naval assets.  
                                                 
2 Muller, David G., Jr. China as a Maritime Power. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), 7. 
3 Ibid., 7. 
4 Ibid., 8. 
5 Ibid., 9. 
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Hence, the personnel in the formative years of PLAN were 
mainly drawn from different army units of the PLA and these 
former Nationalists.    
 The Soviet Union had a strong presence in the Lushan 
area from the end of World War II.  Therefore, the Soviet 
Union was an important factor in the Chinese maritime 
affairs in the immediate postwar period.  The Soviets 
offered the training for future Chinese naval officers and 
enlisted personnel at the Dalian academy and another 
training school in Jiamusi near the Soviet-Manchurian 
border.6 
 On April 23, 1949, the East China Military Region Navy 
was formed the same day with General Zhang Aiping as the 
first commander and political commissar.  Because of this, 
many consider April 23, 1949 as the birthday of PLAN.  
However, the formal establishment of the Navy came one year 
later, on April 14, 1950, by order of the Central Military 
Commission (CMC) and with the establishment of the national 
Naval Headquarters at Beijing, with Xiao Jingguang as its 
first Commander.7  Zhang and Xiao were officers who had 
spent their entire careers as army commanders and were 
transferred to the navy for political reliability, not 
because of any actual naval experience.8 
Mao employed a guerrilla strategy of “people’s war,” 
to fight the Japanese in World War II and the Kuomintang in 
the 1945-1949 civil war.  This concept of “active defense” 
worked by drawing the enemy deep into China’s interior, and 
Chinese forces would then tire out the overstretched enemy 
and launch a counteroffensive to drive the enemy out.  It 
was a strategy intended to defeat a superior technological 
                                                 
6 Muller, 12. 
7 Cole, 17.  
8 Ibid., 17. 
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force.  The defensive posture of people’s war doctrine did 
not call for the projection of sea power and was designed 
for “guerrilla skirmishes against invaders at sea” and was 
centered around a light type navy.9 
B.  POST-REVOLUTION TRENDS THROUGH THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT 
1949-1959 
On October 1, 1949, at Tiananmen gate in front of the 
Forbidden City, Mao declared that, “The Chinese people have 
stood up!” and the People's Republic of China was 
established with the creation of a people's democratic 
dictatorship.10  The party was under Mao's chairmanship, and 
Zhou Enlai was premier of the State Administrative Council.  
The people were neatly placed into four social classes: the 
workers, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and the 
national bourgeoisie.11  These four classes were to be led 
by the CCP, the vanguard of the working class. 
The Communists came to power with limited resources 
and a perception of external threats that persuaded them to 
postpone building a maritime force.  The fledgling PRC was 
faced with establishing itself in the unstable world of the 
Cold War era.  The international system was confronted with 
a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Mao’s government was not accepted as legitimate by the 
United States.  However, the People’s Republic of China was 
immediately recognized by the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe bloc.  This gave birth to the decade of the Sino-
Soviet alliance, and, after substantial talks with Moscow, 
the PRC was given aid by the Soviet Union. 
                                                 
9 You, Ji. The Armed Forces of China. (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 164. 
10 Schell, Orville. Mandate of Heaven: The Legacy of Tiananmen Square and the Next Generation of China's 
Leaders. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 24. 
11 Meisner, Maurice J. Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic. 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Free 
Press, 1999), 60. 
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Under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance 
and Mutual Assistance, the Chinese established very firm 
security and economic ties to the Moscow.  The USSR had 
tremendous political and economic power.  Stalin agreed to 
China’s request for a five-year $300 million loan, and he 
agreed that China could use half of it to pay for Soviet 
equipment for the Chinese navy.12 
1.  Force structure 
During the first decade after the PLAN was established 
in 1949, its closest and most important relationship was 
with the Soviet Navy.  Given the fact that the PRC was not 
recognized by the United States and several other Western 
countries, China was restricted to trade primarily over 
land with the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc nations.  
With Soviet assistance, China was able to develop the 
infrastructure needed for a navy.13 
Ties to the Soviet Union served the critical purposes 
of providing the PLAN with ships, submarines, and other 
equipment.  The need for shore-based naval aircraft, 
fighters and bombers, was also based on a borrowed maritime 
strategic concept.  Like the Soviets, the Chinese had to 
economize on naval construction for basic industrial and 
political development.   
 Mao continued to allow the Soviets to use Lushun, and 
the Soviet Naval Advisory Mission was established in the 
early 1950s to offer advisors and several types of Soviet 
warships.14  In 1951, the Soviets gave the PRC its first 
ships--World War II-era torpedo boats.  In 1954, China 
                                                 
12 Nathan, Andrew J., and Robert S. Ross. The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security. 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1997) 39. 
13 Yung, Christopher D. People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century. Alexandria, VA: 
Center for Naval Analysis. (March 1996) 11. 
14 Kondapalli, Srikanth. "China's Naval Equipment Acquisition." Strategic Analysis 23, no. 9 (December 
1999):1509-30. available online <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-dec9-7.html> 
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received its first operational Soviet submarines.  Most of 
the technology transferred was primarily for coastal 
operations.  For the PRC, the Korean War was primarily a 
land and air war, so the naval development in China was not 
a priority.15  After 1955, Soviet assistance focused on 
helping the Chinese build their own ships in indigenous 
shipyards. 
2.  “People’s War under modern conditions” Doctrine 
Despite the fact that “People’s War” was standard 
doctrine until the late 1970s, during the Korean War, 
Chinese troops were faced with modern air and naval power.  
This forced China’s military planners to recognize the role 
these weapons would have in future wars.  After the Korean 
War, “People’s War under modern conditions” emerged and 
adhered to the same basic principles as “People’s War” with 
some modifications.  War would be with an enemy possessing 
superior arms and develop into a large-scale conflict with 
sophisticated weapons and China would be the main 
battlefield.  This modification was prompted by the United 
States and its credible threat to use nuclear weapons.  
Beijing secretly started Projects 02 (nuclear weapons), 05 
(ballistic missiles), 09 (nuclear power submarines), and JL 
(submarine launched ballistic missiles).16   
C.  SINO-SOVIET SPLIT 
 By the late 1950s, Beijing split from the Soviet 
leadership over ideological and other issues that led to a 
withdrawal of technical advisors from China in 1959.  In 
1956, Mao Zedong and his associates had already begun 
criticizing Defense Minister Peng Dehuai for adopting 
Soviet military practices uncritically, without regard to 
                                                 
15 Cole, 20. 
16 Lewis, John Wilson, and Xue Litai. China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the 
Nuclear Age. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), 212. 
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the peculiar conditions applying to China and the extensive 
military experience of the PLA during the civil war.17 
Nikita Khrushchev introduced the doctrine of peaceful 
coexistence between the socialist and capitalist worlds, 
and the Soviets seemed unwilling to give their support to 
the PRC on the Taiwan question.18  This led to a rivalry 
within the international communist movement between the 
Beijing and Moscow.  The Chinese accused the Soviet Union 
of “revisionism,” and the Soviets countered with charges of 
“dogmatism,”19 
The Soviet suspension of aid was a serious setback to 
the Chinese, who were attempting to develop industrial and 
high-level technology.  From late 1959 until the mid-1960s, 
the Soviets recalled all of their technicians and advisers 
from China and reduce—then canceled—the flow of economic 
and technical aid to China.  This affected the efforts of 
the PLAN because the loss in Soviet technical advisors hurt 
Chinese shipbuilding and limited the development of the 
Navy. 
Chairman Mao was concerned with the Navy as a viable 
force to consolidate national defense and to protect the 
PRC from coastal attack.20  To do this the PRC needed to 
eliminate the KMT on the coastal islands.  The PLA’s first 
campaign to take the island of Quemoy in October 1949 
failed.  However, in early 1950, the Nationalists were 
caught off guard at Hainan and the PLA successfully landed 
and occupied the island.  There is evidence that the PRC 
was contemplating an invasion of Taiwan scheduled for 
                                                 
17 Muller, 33. 
18 Nathan and Ross, 41. 
19 Garver, John W. Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1993), 140. 
20 Kondapalli, Srikanth. "China's Naval Strategy." Strategic Analysis 23, no. 12 (March 2000): 2037-51. available 
online <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-oct9-4.html> 
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spring of 1950, but they postponed it to the summer of 
1951.21  These landings never materialized and the Chinese 
were faced with the commencement of hostilities on the 
Korean peninsula.   
The Korean War was extremely important in the PRC’s 
formative years.  While the PLAN played a small role in the 
conflict, U.S. involvement shaped the PRC and PLA maritime 
thinking for the next two decades.  Days after North Korea 
invaded South Korea, President Truman ordered the Seventh 
Fleet to prevent any attack on Taiwan from the mainland.22  
From that point on, Taiwan was safeguarded under U.S. 
military defense.   
D.  SELF-RELIANCE UNDER MAO’S LEADERSHIP 1960-1976 
In the 1960s, China viewed itself in a position to 
challenge the Soviet Union as the leader of the socialist 
camp and the international communist movement.  The United 
States and the Soviet Union were clearly at the top of 
their respective coalitions and using that power to exploit 
and manipulate others within their sphere of influence as 
well as in the Third World.  China viewed its foreign 
policy in terms of a dual adversary role with the 
superpowers.23  Mao was now working on establishing the PRC 
as the leader for the people in the Third World.  
Diplomatic recognition in Asia and the African continent 
during this time also added new vigor to Mao’s struggle for 
international recognition and legitimacy.24 
During the 1960s, there were internal struggles within 
the Chinese Communist Party.  The Chinese economy in the 
early 1960 was in disarray due to the failure of Mao’s 
                                                 
21 Cole, 18. 
22 Nathan and Ross, 62. 
23 Ibid., 43. 
24 Ibid., 45. 
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“Great Leap Forward.”  In an effort to stabilize the 
economy, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun initiated 
a series of corrective measures. In 1962, Mao began the 
Socialist Education Movement and attempted to purify the 
party.  The primary emphasis was on restoring ideological 
purity, infusing revolutionary fervor into the party and 
government bureaucracies, and intensifying class struggle.  
This Socialist Education Movement, paired with "learn from 
the People's Liberation Army," served to enhance Mao and 
Lin Biao’s power.25  
1.  Cultural Revolution 
In late 1965, Mao and his supporters (Lin Biao, his 
wife Jiang Qing, and Chen Boda) made an effort to purge and 
attack a wide variety of people that included party and 
state leaders.  By mid-1966, Mao's campaign had exploded 
into the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the first 
mass action to attack the CCP apparatus itself. 
The Cultural Revolution manifested the CCP’s internal 
rivalries.  On the one side was the Mao-Lin Biao group, 
supported by the PLA, and on the other side was a faction 
led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, whose strength was in 
the party institutions and operations.   
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution also 
affected the PLAN.  However, unlike other Party and 
military establishments, the clashes largely affected and 
were confined to the higher echelons.  As a result, many 
senior officers were purged or came under a political cloud 
and had no choice but to resign.26 
                                                 
25 Lewis and Xue, 35. 
26 Kondapalli, China's Naval Strategy 
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Beijing viewed the Soviet Navy as a major amphibious 
invasion threat.27  The Chinese were alarmed in 1966-68 by 
the steady Soviet military buildup along their common 
border.  The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 
heightened Chinese apprehensions.  In March 1969, Chinese 
and Soviet troops clashed on Zhenbao Island in the disputed 
Wusuli Jiang border area.  
2.  Leaders 
The ongoing internal factional struggles inside the 
CCP compelled Peng Dehuai, the then Defense Minister and 
military strongman, to step down in 1959.  This resulted in 
the ascendancy of Lin Biao as the most powerful military 
leader.  Lin Biao had a better understanding about the 
long-term strategic concepts of an operational naval force.  
The navy’s political commissar, Li Xuepeng, was a close 
friend of Lin’s.   
3.  Force structure 
The flow of Soviet ship components and spare parts 
dried up and naval and national leadership learned how 
vulnerable China had become as a result of its dependence 
upon a foreign country.  The PLAN was forced to look 
internally and develop its capabilities with Soviet plans, 
but without Soviet advisors.  The Chinese successfully 
added the Komar missile boat, the Shanghai class coastal 
patrol boat, the Hainan sub chaser, and the Hushuan 
hydrofoil torpedo boat to the surface fleet.28  The sub 
surface fleet featured the Romeo class attack submarine and 
one Golf class submarine for the JL-1 SLBM.  The PLAN had 
to be satisfied with whatever limited budget allocation was 
forthcoming.  
                                                 
27 Cole, 22. 
28 Muller, 94. 
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4.  Soft Alignment 
The next period the Chinese entered into was a phase 
of Sino-American soft alignment against the Soviet Union.29  
The Soviets were becoming increasingly powerful in the 
international arena.  Mao’s call to “dig tunnels deep, 
store grain everywhere” is perhaps the most concrete 
indication of how serious the Soviet threat was during 
those years.  The Chinese saw the Soviet Union as 
expansionist and imperialist.  The Soviet Pacific fleet was 
rapidly expanding and was receiving Moscow’s latest 
combatants, including nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed 
surface ships.30   
To Beijing, the United States was clearly on the 
decline due to the losses suffered in Vietnam and was 
making overtures to reconcile past differences.  China 
viewed Japan as a lackey of the United States.  The Nixon-
Sato communiqué of November 1969 linked Japan’s security to 
the security of South Korea and to the Taiwan Strait.  As 
the United States diminished commitments in the region 
Japan was to become an “Asian policeman.”31  
President Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972 and 
the resulting Shanghai Communiqué catapulted the Chinese 
international status to heights never before realized.  The 
Chinese still saw the Americans as an imperialist power, 
but it was no longer the foremost threat.   
5. End of Mao 
The year 1976 saw the deaths of Zhou Enlai in January 
and Mao Zedong in September, the two most senior officials 
in the CCP.  In April of the same year, demonstrators in 
                                                 
29 Nathan and Ross, 44. 
30 Cole, 24. 
31 Muller, 113. 
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Tiananmen Square memorialized Zhou Enlai and criticized 
Mao's closest associates, Zhou's opponents.   
In April 1976, Deng was removed from all his public 
posts, and a relative unknown, Hua Guofeng--a Political 
Bureau member, vice premier, and minister of public 
security--was named acting premier and party first vice 
chairman. Even though Mao Zedong's role in political life 
had become irregular in his later years, it was still 
important.  The political system had polarized in the years 
before Mao's death into increasingly bitter and 
irreconcilable factions.  His death only partially resolved 
the problems inherent in the succession struggle.  
The radical clique most closely associated with Mao 
and the Cultural Revolution became vulnerable after Mao 
died, as Deng had been after Zhou’s demise.  In October, 
less than a month after Mao's death, the Gang of Four were 
arrested and within days it was proclaimed that Hua Guofeng 
had assumed the positions of party chairman, chairman of 
the party's Central Military Commission, and premier. 
E. DENG XIAOPING’S NAVY 
Over the next two years, the post-Mao leadership then 
fell under the influence of Deng Xiaoping.  Deng Xiaoping's 
power was solidified at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
National Party Congress Central Committee in December 1978.  
The party line calling for protracted class struggle was 
exchanged for promoting the “four modernizations”--the 
modernization of industry, agriculture, science and 
technology, and national defense.  Deng Xiaoping mobilized 
the Chinese people and began to make China a world power. 
National development and economic goals would be the 
measure of the success or failure of policies.  China's 
leaders experimented with ways to modernize the economy.  
 14
New agricultural policies allowing peasants to produce more 
on their own initiative were approved.  China accepted 
international bank loans and entered into joint ventures 
with foreign capitalists.   
The year 1979 witnessed the formal exchange of 
diplomatic recognition between the People's Republic and 
the United States, a border war between China and Vietnam 
with no significant naval involvement, and the 
determination not to extend the thirty-year-old Treaty of 
Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet 
Union.    
1. Integration with Chinese Characteristics 
China in the 1980s increasingly used improved 
bilateral relations and a variety of international forums 
to project its independent foreign policy while opening up 
to the outside world.  The two superpowers were in both a 
nuclear and conventional arms race against each other.  
China was no longer dependent on aligning itself with 
another country for support or to provide a balance, and it 
was making efforts to integrate itself into the global 
community.  Beijing continued to balance its concern for 
security with its desire for an independent foreign policy.  
China continued to insist that the Soviet Union remove the 
"three obstacles" before relations between the Chinese and 
Soviet governments and parties could improve.   
In the mid-1980s, China launched its highly ambitious 
program of military modernization with a decision to reduce 
its existing military forces.  The PLAN’s role was 
redefined to include projection of force beyond of the 
immediate coast.  This gradually led the PLAN to shift to 
building major surface combatants and submarines.  
Generally, this period is taken as the turning point in a 
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transition from China’s traditional coastal defense to one 
of power projection onto the high seas. 
2. Mission 
The 1985 decision on military modernization called for 
changes in the PLA in all aspects: size, types of weapons, 
and doctrine.  It emerged gradually out of changing 
security perceptions since the 1970s.  During the late 
1970s, there had been an emerging need for the improvement 
of a merchant marine force and the consequent need to 
protect sea-lanes.  China also had a growing interest in 
offshore oil resources in the South China Sea.  There was 
always the fear of a possible Soviet blockade and an 
amphibious assault.32  To cope with these problems, the need 
for modernization of the navy was acknowledged by the 
Chinese political leadership. 
By the late 1980s, PLAN missions were defined to be 
safeguarding China’s territorial integrity, being prepared 
for a potential requirement to blockade Taiwan, preventing 
a sea based invasion of China, and, over the long term, 
building a survivable, sea-based nuclear retaliatory 
force.33   
During the early 1980s, the PLAN began conducting 
voyages farther from coastal waters: 
-In April and May 1980: the PLAN sent a composite 
formation of eighteen ships to the South Pacific to 
provide security for China’s first CSS-4 ICBM launch 
tests over water.  
 
-In October 1983 to April 1984: the navy dispatched an 
oceangoing rescue vessel to the Pacific Ocean three 
                                                 
32 Kondapalli, China's Naval Strategy  
33 Godwin, Paul H. B. "From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy, and Capabilities Towards 2000," 
China Quarterly 146 (June 1996), 469. 
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times, where it tracked an experimental communications 
satellite. 
 
-In November 1984 to April 1985: the Navy dispatched a 
salvage vessel to join the first oceangoing formation 
from China to the South Pacific and Antarctica to 
conduct scientific studies.  
 
-In 1985: the PLAN sent three ships on a coast-hugging 
voyage to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka for the 
first time.34 
In 1985, China’s military strategy shifted again 
because of the Deng’s conclusion that a major war with the 
Soviet Union was not probable.  A focus on “limited war,” 
with short clashes restricted certain geographic areas, was 
adopted. 
3.  “Limited War” Doctrine 
In the early 1980s, the PLA was still concerned with a 
major war with its superpower neighbor, the Soviet Union.  
This called for a defense deployed for anti-attack 
purposes, but it did not exclude the possibility of 
offensive strikes for the purpose of self-defense or for 
offensive action after a period of defense.35  
Even though the PLAN's role and function in war was 
still a marginal one, the new maritime strategy now 
addressed a “green water” scope for naval activities.   
4. Leaders 
The PLAN Commander from 1982 to 1988, Admiral Liu 
Huaqing, also served later as vice chairman of the CMC.  He 
was resolute on developing the relationships with the 
                                                 
34 McVadon, Eric A and Kenneth W. Allen. China's Foreign Military Relations Henry L. Stimson Center. (October 
1999) available online  <http://www.stimson.org/china/pdf/chinmil.pdf>, 47. 
35 You Ji, 165. 
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Europeans and in concluding agreements that led to the 
acquisition of different weapon systems.36  PLA naval 
doctrine by China’s third Navy Commander Admiral Liu 
Huaqing was the first one to publicly present and employ an 
‘offshore active defense strategy’.37 
F.  SUMMARY-END OF AN ERA 
In the 1990s, China reassessed the new security 
environment of Asia in the post-Cold War era.  The collapse 
of the Soviet Union forced China to focus its efforts in an 
increasingly unipolar world with the United States-led 
international system.  China's overwhelming national 
objective has been to see China rise to the status of a 
great power in a multipolar world.38 
The 1991 Gulf War revealed the capabilities of the 
technologically advanced forces of the United States.  This 
further re-invigorated Chinese leaders’ attention towards 
the Navy.  A relationship with Moscow that preceded the 
collapse of the USSR was also revamped. 
                                                 
36 McVadon and Allen, 47. 
37 Singh, Swaran “Continuity and Change in China's Maritime Strategy.” Strategic Analysis 23, no. 9 (December 
1999):1493-1508. available online <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-dec9-6.html> 
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III. CHINA’S SECURITY NEEDS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
A. CHINA’S RIVALRY WITH INDIA 
During the Cold War the PRC-Indian relationship was 
tenuous.  At different times both nations were allied with 
the Soviets, and both focused on a series of economic 
programs to develop their respective infrastructures.  
While the two were never close, neither were they hostile.   
Since the 1962 war, China has continued its occupation 
of the Aksai Chin area, through which it built a strategic 
highway linking Tibet and Xinjiang autonomous regions.39  
India's primary security interest is in Arunachal Pradesh, 
the state bordering Tibet.  After the 1962 Sino-Indian 
border war, the relations between China and India improved, 
but never quite reached the high experienced in the 1950’s. 
India claims it was the Chinese threat, not Pakistan, 
that prompted it to develop a nuclear weapons capability 
and conduct tests in 1998.40  A week before the 1998 tests, 
Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes said in a 
controversial interview that “China is potential threat 
number one…the potential threat from China is greater than 
that from Pakistan, and any person who is concerned about 
India’s security must agree with that fact.”41  The day 
after the first round of tests, on May 12, PRC media 
devoted surprisingly brief stories to the test, and on May 
13, before the second round of tests had been announced, a 
foreign ministry spokesperson noted only that “the Chinese 
government expresses its grave concern” and that the tests 
                                                 
39 Roy, 172. 
40 Known as the Pokhran II tests of 1998. India notes that it was the threat from Chinese ICBM, vice Pakistani 
ownership of nuclear weapons, which brought about the development of India’s nuclear capability.  Jha, Prem 
Shankar “Why India Went Nuclear” Columbia International Affairs Online Vol. 2, No. 3 (Jul.–Sept.1998) found 
online <http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/wa/wa_sep98jhp.html> 
41 Frazier, Mark W. "China-India Relations since Pokhran II: Assessing Sources of Conflict and Cooperation" 
National Bureau of Asian Research Vol. 3, No. 2 available online 
<http://www.nbr.org/publications/review/vol3no2/essay.html> 
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were “detrimental to peace and stability in the South Asian 
region.”42 
 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, India and China 
are two Asian nations competing for international and 
regional influence.  China faces India as the only other 
Asian nation comparable in size, population, and military 
capability.  Behind the United States and Japan, China then 
India are becoming the major military forces in Asia. 
1. Indian Ocean 
 The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean in the 
world and lies to the south of Asia between Africa and 
Australia with Antarctica in the South.43  The Indian Ocean 
is both an international trade lifeline and a strategic 
waterway for India's maritime trade and energy supply.  The 
Indian Ocean has 36 states around its littoral belt with a 
population of over a billion people.44  India promotes a 
policy that stresses “South Asia for the people of South 
Asia.”45 
2. Indian Navy 
The Indian navy is now the largest naval force in the 
Indian Ocean.  India’s development of a navy dedicated to 
sea control of the Indian Ocean is in its initial stages of 
development.  The Indian navy is transitioning from a 
littoral force to a blue-water one.  While primarily 
capable of sea control duties, the indications are clear 
that development is underway.  Since the 1990s, India has 
further stepped up control of the Indian Ocean.  The Indian 
navy has drawn up a 25-year (from 1990 to 2015) 
modernization plan to maintain a kind of "strong and 
                                                 
42 Frazier  
43 Sidhu, K. S. The Role of Navy in India's Defense. (New Delhi: Harnam Publications, 1983) p.1 
44 Sidhu, K. S. The Role of Navy in India's Defense. (New Delhi: Harnam Publications, 1983) p.2 
45 FBIS-CHI-2000-1120 “China NDU Professor Views India’s Military Power” 
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effective military presence" and to ensure an effective 
"prevention against any powers entering the Indian Ocean."46  
In February of 2001, India hosted an International 
Fleet Review (IFR) in Mumbai.  The event brought naval 
vessels from all the major powers including the US, the UK, 
Russia, and France.47  Later, in May of 2001, Chinese 
vessels arrived for the first time since 1994 to conduct 
maneuvers with the Indian Navy.48 
To counter the threat, India perceives it must develop 
a fleet capable of checking the Chinese navy at every 
opportunity, as far from Indian shores as possible.  Even 
though goodwill visits by ships of both nations have 
occurred, the indication is clear—China is looking to 
expand into the Indian Ocean and India must slow its 
progress, if not prevent it.  
3. Encirclement 
For years, India has been fearful of China’s attempts 
to suppress and limit India’s growth, keeping it in a 
secondary position.  More importantly, India believes that 
China is conducting its operation of Indian suppression 
through a campaign of “encirclement.”  The “encirclement” 
theory of India focuses on China’s close relations with 
India’s neighbors.  Based upon the belief that China is 
suppressing Indian growth by surrounding it internationally 
through close ties with Pakistan, Myanmar and other nations 
in South Asia, the theory makes China—―and the influence it 
exerts upon these other, “encircling” nations—―a major 
threat to Indian development and security.  China’s actions 
                                                 
46 FBIS-CHI-2000-1120 “China NDU Professor Views India’s Military Power” 
47 Jane’s Online, Newsbriefs, item:SAP20010523000015, pg 2. 
48 Jane’s Online, Newsbriefs, item:SAP20010523000015, pg 1. 
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come as no surprise to India, for they follow the Kautilyan 
logic of international relations.49 
Besides the close military ties China has with 
Pakistan, India also points to recent naval operations 
China has conducted in the Indian Ocean.  Specifically, New 
Delhi points to deployments through the Malacca Straits.  
In addition, visits to Myanmar, Indonesian and Pakistani 
ports have brought Chinese vessels through the waterways 
India seeks to control.   
C. PLAN ACTIVITIES 
1. Sea Lines of Communication 
Sea lines of communication connect the world.  During 
peace, these routes act as vital commercial trade routes.  
When countries are at war, these routes serve as strategic 
lines of communication between forces.  The South China Sea 
to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East Asia coupled with 
East China Sea and the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean 
and the Pacific coast of the United States are two 
significant sea lines of communications for China.50  
 2. Energy 
  The value of the PLAN as an instrument of Chinese 
foreign policy can no longer be denied.  China’s maritime 
economy grew 17% per year in the 1980s and 20% per year in 
the 1990s, and China is the third largest shipbuilding 
nation in the world.51  Because of China’s economic and 
security interests—―each of which has important maritime 
                                                 
49 Kautilya was one of India’s, oldest political philosophers of international relations.  Kautilya presents a very 
realist, structural view of the international structure, encouraging leaders to maintain power through subjugation of 
enemies. One of the basic tenets of Kautilya, is that a nation’s neighbor is its natural enemy.  Likewise, the neighbor 
of one’s enemy, should be made one’s ally.  
50 Ji Guoxing “SLOC Security in the Asia Pacific.” Center occasional paper, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 
Honolulu, Hawaii (February 2000) available online <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Paper_SLOC_Occasional.htm> 
51 Forsberg, Steven J. “Is a China India Naval Alliance Possible?” Proceedings, (March 2002), 70. 
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characteristics—―greater resources have been devoted to the 
modernization of the PLAN. 
Concerns about China’s energy security are rooted in 
projections of the country’s future energy demand and 
supply.52  Domestic production of energy appears limited.  
While China's primary energy needs will continue to be 
based chiefly on coal, oil will take priority in assessing 
China's security. 
Continued economic growth has resulted in rising 
demand for oil and gas energy resources in China.  China 
has been a net importer of oil since 1993, and oil will be 
the only possible primary fuel that will be able to satisfy 
the soaring demand of Chinese transportation and industry-
the most rapidly growing sector of energy demand for all 
developing economies.53  Currently around half of China’s 
oil imports are from the Middle East. 
3.  Myanmar 
Myanmar’s (formerly known as Burma) strategic position 
between China and India gives the relationship between 
Beijing and Yangoon a wider than merely bilateral 
significance.54  In August 2000, the State Law Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC; reorganized as the State Peace 
Development Council or SPDC, in 1997) regime in Myanmar 
conducted military naval and army exercises overseen by 
Chinese military advisory teams along the coast of the 
Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal.  This area is some 300 
nautical miles from India, and within 450 miles of the 
strategic Straits of Malacca, which is vital to 
                                                 
52 Dowens, Erica Strecker. China’s Quest for Energy Security. (Santa Monica, Calf.: RAND, 2000) available online 
<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1244> 
53 Troush, Sergei. “China's Changing Oil Strategy and its Foreign Policy Implications” Center for Northeast Asia 
Policy Studies Working Paper, (Fall 1999) available online 
<http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/fp/cnaps/papers/1999_troush.htm - FN2_BACK> 
54 Hill, John.  “Myanmar’s Favor in Demand” Jane’s Intelligence Review February 01, 2002 
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international shipping between the Persian Gulf and the 
South China Sea/Pacific Ocean.55  This Greater Coco Island 
area is where the PLA reputedly has set up electronic 
surveillance to monitor the Indian Ocean and some 400 miles 
north of the Straits of Malacca.56  The port would also be 
within close proximity to Port Blair, the Indian facility 
responsible for defending the Nicobar and Andaman Islands. 
Recent attempts to establish Chinese ports in Myanmar 
unnerve India.  If China is able to secure a port at the 
mouth of the Irrawaddy, near Yangoon, it will have achieved 
access to the Indian Ocean directly.57  There are numerous 
reports of the increased presence of Chinese migrants who 
now dominate the populations along the banks of both the 
Irrawaddy and Salween Rivers.   
4.  Pakistan 
Perhaps the close military and economic ties China has 
with Pakistan is the main reason for India viewing China as 
a threat.  To utilize the Makran Coast for trade purposes, 
China will build a 653-km coastal highway from Gawadar to 
Karachi at a cost of $1.6 billion.58  Further, China has 
shown interest in Pakistan’s Sandaik mining project and it 
will provide a loan of one billion dollars to Pakistan for 
the railways and communication.59  
The Gawadar port, which is located at the opening of 
the Persian Gulf, carries great importance from a 
geographic point of view.  According to defense experts, 
China would not only construct the Gawadar port, but it 
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Taiwan and the Asia/Pacific Region.” American Foreign Policy Council Investigative Report, (September 2000) 
available online <http://www.afpc.org/pubs/thailand.htm> 
56 Santoli 
57 Roy, 174. 
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 25
will also upgrade it.60  China will also establish naval 
installations at the port, from which it would be able to 
keep a close eye on the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.  
Apart from this, with Chinese naval installations at this 
port, India’s growing power in the Indian Ocean can also be 
countered.61   
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IV. THE CAPABILITIES OF THE PLA NAVY 
In terms of both its history and geography, mainland 
China has traditionally been classified as a continental 
power.  Taking a broader view, however, China can also be 
thought of as a maritime country.  Liu Huaqing, former PLAN 
commander, has characterized the twenty-first century as 
the ‘century of the sea.’62  He also has stated that a 
modern navy is needed to protect China’s three million 
square miles of territorial waters, 11,250 miles of 
coastline, and more than 6,000 islands63 
Seapower and sea-control capabilities are of growing 
importance for the Chinese view of the relationship between 
its nation power and maritime power.64  To better understand 
which direction the PLAN might progress, this chapter will 
examine PLAN current capabilities and a number of key 
issues that could influence modernization’s success or 
failure.65   
A. SURFACE  
Over the past decade, the PLAN has seen considerable 
growth of its surface fleet.  The rapid modernization of 
the Taiwanese navy has been particularly alarming to the 
PLA high command.66  China has more than doubled its 
replenishment ship fleet, acquired destroyers and frigates 
with greater range and speed, and embarked on an aggressive 
naval replacement shipbuilding program.67 
 
                                                 
62 Hutchings, Graham. Modern China:  A Guide to a Century of Change. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2001), 334. 
63 Ibid., 334. 
64 Bullock, Chris. “From ‘Coastal’ to ‘Forward’ Defense The Development of a Chinese Naval Strategy for the 21st 
Century” Proceedings of the 2nd Annual Military and Strategic Studies Colloquium  available online 
<http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/smss/Colloquium2000/Bullock.html> 
65 For a complete list of PLAN surface, submarine and air force assets see Appendixes B-E 
66 You Ji, 188. 
67 Yung, 12-13. 
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1. Sovremennyy-class destroyer 
In December 1996, China reached an agreement with 
Russia for the purchase of two Sovremennyy-class guided 
missile destroyers.  The first ship was delivered in early 
2000, and the second was delivered January 2001.  The two 
destroyers are designed to enhance the PLAN's surface 
strike capabilities and its ability to deploy over longer 
distances.  The destroyers are equipped with the SS-N-22 
“Sunburn” anti-ship missiles, which have a long fire range, 
great power, and strong interference capability, and they 
are also rumored to be able to effectively deal with 
aircraft carrier groups.68  These are the first Chinese 
warships to have a data link system.69 On January 3, 2002, 
China ordered two more Sovremenny-class from Russia’s 
Northern Shipyard in St. Petersburg.   
2. Luhai-class destroyer 
In 1999, the PLAN launched its largest, most advanced, 
and most powerful indigenously produced warship, the 
Shenzhan, a Luhai-class destroyer.  The Shenzhan’s 
accomplishments include a recently completed cruise in 
September-October 2001 which included Western Europe and 
Mediterranean port calls.  These show-the-flag cruises 
marked the first time the PLAN has ventured beyond Pacific 
and Indian Ocean waters.70  While the ship is a product of 
the Chinese shipbuilding industry, a significant amount of 
the destroyer systems are imported.  It was announced in 
August 1999 that China would evaluate the performance of 
Shenzhen before beginning construction of a second ship, 
                                                 
68 FBIS-CHI-2000-0215 February 15, 2000 “Article on Modernization of China’s Navy” 
69 Saunders, Stephen, ed. Jane's Fighting Ships: 2001-2002.  London, UK: Jane's Information Group, 2001. 119. 
70 Baker, A.D., III. “Combat Fleets” Proceedings, Feb 2002, 92. 
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but it appears that an expected second ship is not 
forthcoming.71   
3. Luhu-class destroyer 
  In the late 1980s, Luhu-class destroyers were 
introduced into the PLAN inventory.  These provide the 
Chinese navy for the first time with much-needed anti-air 
and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.  Luhu-class 
destroyers are fitted with French-built sonar, Crotale 
point-defense missiles, eight C-802 surface-to-surface 
missiles, and a helicopter deck and hanger.72  Chinese plans 
to augment its surface fleet with additional Luhu-class 
destroyers is evidence of China's shift from coastal to 
ocean-going warship construction.  Sources in Beijing have 
led analysts to believe that two new warships being built 
at Jiangnan shipyard may be new Luhu destroyers.73   
4. Luda-class destroyer 
The most numerous destroyer in the Chinese fleet is 
Luda-class destroyer. In the early 1990s the Dalian 
acquired sophisticated air and surface search radar 
systems.  
5. Jiangwei-class frigates 
 The Jiangwei frigate program started in 1988, with the 
first sea trials conducted in late 1991.74  Six of these 
2,250-ton frigates will supplement the older Jianghu-class, 
built in the mid-1970s.  The Jiangwei’s carry CY-1 anti-
submarine weapons, C801 anti-ship missiles, and HQ-61 
surface-to-air missiles, as well as a two Z-9A 
helicopters.75   
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6. Jianghu-class frigates 
The older generation Jianghu-class frigates I/II are 
the most numerous class of warships serving with the PLAN.  
These have gone through numerous revisions and have been 
sold abroad to Egypt, Thailand, and Bangladesh.  These 
Jianghu-class frigates are a modification of the Jiangdong 
class with SSM in place of SAM.  Jianghu III frigates have 
improved ESM/ECM suites and the Jianghu IV have a 
helicopter hanger, while the Jianghu V have no helicopter 
and reduced number of missiles. 
7. Missile boats 
The Houxin class (Type 030-11) guided missile ship was 
introduced in 1991.  There are 20 such ships in the PLAN 
inventory and they are dedicated to the South China Sea 
Fleet.  This class of missile boat is permitting the 
retirement of the Hegu and Huoku class missile boats.76   
B. SUBMARINES 
With more than 100 conventionally powered submarines 
and several nuclear submarines in reserve and on duty, 
China’s submarine corps is the second largest in the world 
today.  The submarine corps of the PLAN is one of the most 
significant combat arms of the country and is indeed its 
trump card to deter any potential enemy.77  
The PLAN has seven submarine flotillas, each flotilla 
is composed of two, four-boat squadrons, deployed among the 
three fleets.  The numbers of flotillas and squadrons in 
each flotilla have been diminished as the large Romeo-class 
force has steadily declined.  Domestic development of 
conventional submarines had been restricted by the lack of 
manpower and funding directed into the nuclear-powered 
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fleet.  Construction of the nuclear-powered Han-class 
attack submarine is continuing. 
1. Xia-class and Type 094 SSBNs 
China’s sea-based missile force consists of one 
ballistic missile submarine that has been plagued with 
problematic operational capabilities.  Although this one 
Xia-class nuclear-ballistic missile submarine is not always 
operational, it still can carry up to 12 JL-1 SLBM.  
Construction of the experimental Xia-class has stopped 
while the PLAN awaits the new Type 094 class.  
Four to eight of this new class of Type 094s is 
expected to deploy in the next few years and will carry 16 
launch tubes for the longer range MIRV JL-2 SLBM that are 
estimated to have a range of 4,900 miles. 
2. Han-class and Type 093 SSNs 
The Han-class submarines have been in commission since 
1974.  It took a long time for the Chinese to build this 
class of submarine, given problems relating to the power 
plant.78  A key requirement for the PLAN is a second-
generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, Type 093.  
Prefabrication of a Type 093 nuclear attack submarine began 
in 1994 and the boat is expected to be launched in 2002 
from Huludao shipyard.  The in-service date has been set at 
2004, with a second of the class to follow two years 
later.79 
3. Kilo-class SSK 
The acquisition from Russia of four Kilo-class 
submarines at a cost of more than US$810 million has 
provided China with a proven conventional submarine 
platform.  The submarines, the first Project 636 models to 
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be sold abroad, are reportedly fitted with automatic 
torpedo launching equipment and advanced noise reduction 
devices.  Despite this advanced weaponry, the PLAN has had 
trouble with training and maintenance costs for them.  
Additional training is underway, but there are reports that 
the PLAN will still not take the Kilos below a depth of 50 
meters.  In 1999, China took possession of its fourth 
Project 636 Kilo-class submarine.  There are rumors that 
China may obtain a fifth Kilo, but this is far from 
certain.   
4. Romeo/Ming/Song-class SS 
The first Chinese Romeo-class (Type 031) submarine was 
built in 1962.  For several years, China’s conventional 
submarine fleet was based on Soviet-supplied Romeo-class 
patrol submarines.  In 1987, the production of this class 
was stopped, giving way to the improved Ming version.80  
The Ming-class is a modified and enlarged version of 
the Romeo-class submarine, it was laid down in the 1971-72 
period and became operational by the 1975-76 period.81  
Delay’s in the Song program has led the PLAN to resume the 
Ming-class (Type 035) program, previously thought to have 
ended with the launch of the 14th hull in mid-1996.   
The Song (Type 039) boats will eventually replace the 
Romeos in service and eventually complement the Ming 
submarines.  The first Song-class conventional submarine 
was launched in early 1994 and underwent sea trials in 1999 
with less than impressive results.82 
C. PLAN AIR FORCE 
The principal aviation missions are base defense, 
maritime patrol, and anti-ship operations.  At the founding 
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of the PLANAF, there was only one type of aircraft.  Now 
the PLANAF has about 541 aircraft of several different 
versions.  By the mid-1990s, the Chinese naval air force 
had a total of eight divisions with 27 regiments divided 
among the three sea fleets.
 
 Besides increasing the number 
of ASW helicopters embarked in surface escorts, the PLAN is 
expected to acquire better, longer-range, land-based 
maritime patrol aircraft.  The recent acquisition of the 
Soviet Su-27 should help the PLAN improve its short-range 
air cover.83  The limited flight radius of land-based naval 
aircraft exposes PLAN surface units to enemy air attack.84  
  Despite rumors alleging Chinese interests, the Chinese 
still do not have an aircraft carrier and most of the 
PLANAF are shore-based combat aircraft.  If China were to 
build or purchase an aircraft carrier, such an asset would 
enable it to provide increased air defense, support for 
amphibious operations, and project force.85  According to a 
January 2000 Ta Kung Pao article, China has been studying 
building an aircraft carrier, but has not decided to build 
one.86 
Although highly speculative, some sources contend that 
if Beijing decides to proceed, the displacement of China's 
first aircraft carrier will be 48,000 tons.87  According to 
these sources the aircraft carrier, which would use Russian 
TB12 technology for its steam turbine, will be able to 
navigate at a maximum speed of 30 knots and will be 
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outfitted to embark 24 Su-30 aircraft, which China bought 
from Russia for US$2 billion.88 
D. PLAN AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITIES 
  PLAN amphibious landing capability—which is comprised 
of two brigades—is limited by the small amount of 
amphibious warfare ships in the PLAN’s inventory.  China is 
continuing to improve its capabilities to conduct 
amphibious and airborne operations.  Although China has 
never conducted an exercise of division-size or larger 
exercise and was fully coordinated with air support and 
airborne operations, its amphibious force is believed 
capable of landing at least one division on a beach, 
depending on the mix of equipment and stores for immediate 
resupply.  If China were to use its merchant fleet, its 
capability to move forces would increase, although 
inadequate air defense and lack of training in cross-beach 
movement of forces would be critical shortcomings. 
China has built several air-cushion vehicles and 
evaluated their designs, including training by its marine 
force.89  It is expected that China will eventually acquire 
a small number of these craft for a rapid infantry assault 
capability, although the availability of a mother ship for 
regional transits is uncertain.  Probably these craft will 
need to be carried by a suitable cargo ship, amphibious 
vehicle landing ship, or possibly a float-on/float-off 
(FLO/FLO) merchant ship. 
While both marine brigades are primarily prepared for 
a Taiwan contingency, they are not assigned to the East Sea 
Fleet, which has operational responsibility for Taiwan, 
because of the lack of training facilities.  The South Sea 
                                                 
88 Chen, Edward “Republic of China's Ministry of National Defense Closely Watching Reports on Beijing Aircraft-
Carrier” available online <http://www.fas.org/news/china/2000/e-01-12-00-23.htm> 
89 Jane's Defense Sentinel Security Assesment-China and Northeast Asia-12 
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Fleet also possesses the bulk of the all the new Yuhan-
class landing ships.  The combined strength of both 
brigades apparently does not exceed 10,000.90 
E. COASTAL DEFENSE 
  The coastal defense responsibility of the PLAN 
includes warding off impending invasions of the enemy 
troops, protection of industrial assets along the coast, 
including coastal defense artillery and naval bases.  The 
PLAN’s coast guard was developed originally out of based on 
the coastal artillery troops.  With the expansion of 
scientific and technological capabilities, the coast guard 
has been developing into a coastal missile force with 
improvements in its missile attacking capability, 
especially in the aspect of breaking through the enemy’s 
coastal defense lines. 
F. KEY FACTORS FOR SUCCESS 
1. Budget 
China has many factors that could influence the scope 
and success of military modernization.  Officially, China’s 
military spending has received the lowest priority of the 
four modernizations.  In 2001, China’s military 
expenditures are now projected to grow faster than 
expenditures on science and technology.91  The defense 
budget for the year 2000 was estimated at 14.5 billion.92  
Actual military spending is estimated to be anywhere from 
three to ten times the official figure due to accounting 
inconsistencies and under-reporting, as well as funding for 
some big-ticket defense items listed elsewhere.93 
                                                 
90 Jane's Defense Sentinel Security Assesment-China and Northeast Asia-12 
91 Pomfret, John, “China Plans Major Boost in Spending for Military” Washington Post March 6, 2001. 
92 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2000-2001 Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 
November 2000 
93 Eckholm, Erik. “China Is Increasing Its Budget For Military Spending By 17.6%” New York Times 
March 7, 2002  
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These estimates vary according to estimates of 
purchasing power and the inclusion of estimates of other 
sources of military funding.  The official budget excludes 
arms sales revenues, pension costs, the People’s Armed 
Police, and commercial earnings.  There is no official 
transparency in China’s defense budget and expenditure.   
2.  Defense Industries 
The Chinese are beginning to address problems of 
modernization of a defense industry that produces weapons 
of 1950s-1960s quality.  Most defense industries will have 
to be retooled and their workers taught new techniques to 
produce greater amounts of state-of-the-art equipment.94  
The defense industries have been hampered by a number of 
problems for many years.  Except for pockets of excellence 
in nuclear, ballistic and cruise missiles, Chinese 
indigenous defense capabilities are poor, particularly in 
aircraft and submarines.  China has no alternative, while 
it is waiting and restructuring its defense industries, but 
to buy abroad.  
3.  Foreign weapons and technology procurement 
Shortfalls in the defense industrial sector are made 
up by purchasing military equipment abroad.  The Chinese 
have little choice but to turn to the Russians and the 
Israelis for certain systems.  The lessons of the Sino-
Soviet split of 40 years ago have not been lost on the 
leaders of the PRC today.  Purchasing foreign weapons 
technology introduces a perilous security relationship that 
makes Beijing dependent on an external supply of arms.   
The extent to which China will be able to integrate 
foreign equipment and keep up needed maintenance remains an 
                                                 
94 Blasko, Dennis J. “Evaluating Chinese Military Procurement from Russia” in Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn-
Winter 1997-98) available online <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1917pgs.pdf>, 95. 
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uncertain challenge for the PLAN.  Four diesel electric 
Kilo submarines, two of which have had severe maintenance 
problems, have been rumored not to have left port for over 
a year.  The Su-27 has to be returned to Russia every 
thousand hours of flight time for engine overhaul.   
China is not yet capable of producing operational, 
state-of-the art military equipment today.  The fact that 
China is buying so much of its equipment overseas, 
primarily from Russia, but also from other European nations 
as well as Israel, is really testimony to the fact that the 
military-industrial complex within China is still rather 
weak and disorganized. 
4.  PLAN professionalism 
The development of Chinese communism was inexorably 
linked with its military power during China’s civil war, 
and communist leaders have fused civil and military roles.95  
During the Cultural Revolution, the PLA forces had become 
extensively engaged in the political arena and were central 
in maintaining the Party’s power.  One military reform that 
Deng attempted to introduce was reform in the PLA’s command 
structure by placing it under the State’s rather than the 
Party’s policy-making apparatus.  Even though the new 
Military Commission under the National People’s Congress 
was established in the early 1983, its members are 
identical to the still intact CMC.  
The PLA has made vast efforts in recent years to 
establish professionalism in the officer and enlisted 
corps.  They are doing things that should look familiar to 
soldiers in the West—better recruitment of more educated 
soldiers, better retention, and even building up an NCO 
                                                 
95 Heaton, William R. “The People’s Republic of China,” in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., The 
Defense Policies of Nation: A Comparative Study (3rd ed.) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 386. 
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corps.  At present, over 80 percent of naval vessel 
captains and department heads are university graduates, 
whereas the number of naval officers with post-secondary 
academic qualifications or above is nearly 60 percent 
greater than that at the initial stage of reform.96 
G.  MARITIME STRATEGY 
“Blue water” is part of a maritime strategy paradigm 
with “brown” and “Green” water.  Brown water refers to 
littoral ocean areas, within 
about one hundred nautical 
miles of the coastline; green 
water is less definite, 
referring to ocean areas from 
about one hundred nautical 
miles to the next significant 
land formation.97  Blue water 
and safeguarding maritime 
interests, the development of 
the marine economy, an 
upgrading of maritime science 
and technology, and protection of the maritime environment 
goes far beyond all traditional visions of "sea guerrillas" 
that was expected to only deny imperial aggressors access 
to China's shores and territorial waters.98 
In the early 1990s, new technology demanded revisions 
to military doctrine and organization.  In order to make 
the PLAN a viable force, all of the hardware, tactics, 
information, and the professional sailors must all work 
together in a suitable force structure.  In the aftermath 
of the Persian Gulf War, the PLA leadership concluded that 
                                                 
96 FBIS-CHI-1999-0513 April 19, 1999 “Shi Yunsheng on Navy Development” 
97 Cole, 10. 
98 Singh, Continuity and Change in China's Maritime Strategy 
Figure 1.       Adm. Liu Huaqing island chains 
Source: Cole, 165.   
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limited wars were influenced heavily by the impact of 
technology, “limited war under high-tech conditions.”   
While the PLA forces all had been reduced to some degree, 
the PLAN, the Strategic Missile Forces, and People’s 
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) all enjoyed increased 
attention and considerable investment from the 
modernization.  At a 1992 meeting in Beijing, the CMC 
allocated a significantly higher proportion of the defense 
budget to warship procurement to enable the PLAN to 
undertake the enhanced role.   
Admiral Zhang Lianzhong succeeded Admiral Liu as 
commander of the PLAN in 1988, serving in that post until 
1997.  He perpetuated the important relationships with 
European navies, concentrating on significant purchases of 
equipment from France.99  The PLAN is transforming itself 
from a large-scale force into one that is smaller, more 
efficient, and technically proficient.  
H.  SUMMARY 
China’s most inherent security goal is a need for the 
current political leadership to maintain its legitimacy and 
to keep the country together in a stable manner.  Beijing 
declares that China’s fundamental interests lie in its 
domestic development and stability, the peace and 
prosperity of its surrounding regions, and the 
establishment of a new regional security order based on the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.100   
PRC leaders have long recognized that China has been 
encircled by potentially hostile forces.  By maintaining an 
environment conducive to a prosperous economy and the 
ability to defend the Chinese mainland against all existing 
                                                 
99 McVadon and Allen, 47. 
100 China’s National Defense in 2000 White Paper, 16 Oct 2000, FBIS-CHI-2000-1016, p. 4 
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and foreseeable threats, the Chinese state and the 
Communist Party will prosper.  China’s national objectives 
are to achieve internal security and modernization, 
maintain territorial integrity, and achieve peace and 
stability in the region in the wake of Soviet Collapse.101 
Despite the PLAN’s many weaknesses, it is focused on 
correcting those weaknesses.  There is no doubt that the 
Chinese have long way to achieve a modern military.  The 
PRC has started down this road, and if it continues, in 
fifteen or twenty years, it will have not only the 
hardware, but also a much more proficient force, capable of 
projecting power beyond China’s borders. 
                                                 
101 Heaton, 383. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The evidence to support this thesis is compelling.  As 
China persists and strive to realize its economic 
potential, the PLAN will continue to have a growing and 
important role and establish itself as a regional presence 
in the Indian Ocean.  Beijing's interest in this region is 
based on security. 
The realities of the current situation in the Indian 
Ocean as they relate to the PLAN are:  
• The role of the PLAN has evolved from its limited 
Maoist traditions toward becoming a viable modern 
navy.  
• No longer will the role of the PLA Navy in 
China’s security be small in the future. 
• China’s security needs in the Indian Ocean call 
for the continued modernization of the PLA Navy.   
• China’s intention to expand into the Indian 
maritime area of operation will continue to 
solidify current regional relationships.  It may 
also contribute to a naval arms buildup in the 
Indian Ocean region with India. 
 
During the latter part of the twentieth century, the 
United States and China have had some issues that 
accentuated the two governments differences.  These 
variations have resulted in a relationship that has been 
characterized by friction.  Given the United States led 
“War on Terrorism” and commitments to other countries to 
ensure stability, the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific 
region will probably not be reduced in the near future.   
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The United States must participate and encourage the 
involvement of the PRC and other countries in a 
multilateral security structure for navies in the region by 
facilitating fleet exercises, high-level meetings, and 
other trust building measures to ensure stability.  As we 
have seen since September 11th, it is possible for the 
country characterized previously as a “military competitor 
with a formidable resource” to emerge as a country capable 
of earnest support.  Dialogue and diplomacy, coupled with 
the PLA Navy’s growth in understanding of other navies’ 
capabilities and functions, will lead to a greater 
opportunity for continued peace and economic prosperity in 
the expanse of the Indian Ocean.   
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APPENDIX A. MAP OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN 
REGIONS 
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APPENDIX B. CHINA NAVAL BASES 
 
Base Location 
East Sea Fleet 
Headquarters: Shanghai 31° 06'N 121° 22'E 
Dinghai 34° 30'N 118° 48'E 
Hangzhou 30° 18'N 120° 07'E 
Wusong 31° 23'N 121° 30'E 
North Sea Fleet 
Headquarters: Qingdao 36° 04'N 120° 22'E 
Chengshan 37° 23'N 122° 40'E 
Dalian 38° 53'N 121° 37'E 
Huludao(1) 40° 47'N 121°E 
Weihai 37° 30'N 122° 04'E 
South Sea Fleet 
Headquarters: Zhanjiang 21° 10'N 110° 20'E 
Beihai 21° 29'N 109° 10'E 
Guangzhou 23° 08'N 113° 20'E 
Haikou 20° 05'N 110° 25'E 
Huangpu 23° 08'N 113° 31'E 
Shantou 23° 23'N 116° 39'E 
Yulin 22° 37'N 110° 08'E 
Source: Jane's Defense Sentinel Security Assessment-China and Northeast Asia-12 
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APPENDIX C. CHINA’S SURFACE FORCE ASSETS 
Type Role Quantity 
Sovremenny Destroyer 2(+2) 
Luhu (Type 052) Destroyer 2 
Luda I/II (Type 051) Destroyer 15 
Luda III Destroyer 1 
Luhai Destroyer 1 
Jianghu I (Type 053) Frigate 27 
Jianghu II (Type 053) Frigate 1 
Jianghu III/IV (Type 053 HT) Frigate 3 
Jiangwei I (Type 053 H2G) Frigate 4 
Jiangwei II Frigate 6(+2) 
Houjian (Type 037/2, Huang) Fast Attack Craft - Missile 6(+1) 
Houxin (Type 037/1G) Fast Attack Craft - Missile 26 
Huangfen (Type 021, Osa I) Fast Attack Craft - Missile 30 
Houku Fast Attack Craft - Missile 25 
Hainan (Type 037) Fast Attack Craft - Patrol 95 
Haiqing (Type 037/1) Fast Attack Craft - Patrol 22 
Huchuan (Type 025/026) Fast Attack Craft - Torpedo 15 
Shanghai II (Type 062) Fast Attack Craft - Gun 98 
Haijiu Large Patrol Craft 2 
Haizhui/Shanghai III Coastal Patrol Craft 15(+2) 
T 43 (Type 010) Minesweeper - Ocean 27(+13) 
Wosao Minesweeper - Coastal 8(+1) 
Futi (Type 312) Drone Minesweeper 4(+42) 
Wolei Minelayer 1 
Yuting (Type 074) Landing Ship Tank 8 
Yukan (Type 072) Landing Ship Tank 7 
Yuliang (Type 079) Landing Ship Medium 22 
Yudeng (Type 073) Landing Ship Medium 1 
Yudao Landing Ship Medium 1 
Yuhai (Wuhu-A) (Type 074) Landing Ship Medium 13(+3) 
Yunnan (Type 067) Landing Craft Utility 36(+200) 
Yuch'in (Type 068/069) Landing Craft Utility/Personnel 8(+30) 
Jingsah II Hovercraft 10 
Daxin Training Ship 1 
Shichang Air Training Ship 1 
Qiongsha Personnel Attack Transport 6 
Dazhi Submarine Support Ship 1 
Dajiang Submarine Support Ship 3 
Dadong Salvage Ship 1 
Dadao Salvage Ship 1 
Dazhou Submarine Tender 2 
Dalang Submarine Support Ship 4 
Hudong Submarine Rescue Ship 1 




APPENDIX C. CHINA’S SURFACE FORCE ASSETS cont. 
Dayun (Type 904) Cargo Ship 2 
Andong Cargo Ship 1 
Galati Cargo Ship 1 
Yantai Cargo Ship 2 
Danlin Cargo Ship 13 
Hongqi Cargo Ship 5 
Leizhou Cargo Ship 9 
Fuqing Replenishment Ship 2 
Nanyun Replenishment Ship 1 
Shengli Replenishment Ship 2 
Fuzhou Replenishment Ship 7 
Fulin Replenishment Ship 8 
Dandao Coastal Tanker 3 
Guangzhou Coastal Tanker/Water Carrier 5 
Yen Pai Degaussing Vessel 3 
Dadie Intelligence Gathering Vessel 1 
Yuan Wang 1-4 Space Event Ship 4 
Shiyan Space Event Ship 1 
Wuhu B Research Ship 2 
Dahua Research Ship 1 
Xiangyang Hong Research Ship 13 
Yanqian Research Ship 2 
Dajiang Research Ship 2 
Hai Ying Research Ship 2 
Kan Research Ship 2 
Xing Fengshan Research Ship 1 
Hai Research Ship 1 
Dong Fang Hong Research Ship 1 
Hai Yang Research Ship 2 
Shuguang 04 Research Ship 5 
Shuguang (ex-T 43) Research/Survey Ship 1 
Ganzhu Research Ship 1 
Yenlai Survey Ship 5 
Yannan Survey Ship 4 
Wuhu B Research Ship 2 
Yanbing (modified Yanha) Icebreaker 1 
Yanha Icebreaker 3 
Source: Jane's Defense Sentinel Security Assessment-China and Northeast Asia-12 
 1.13.11 Inventory: Surface Fleet 
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APPENDIX D. CHINA’S SUBMARINE FORCE ASSETS 
Type Role Quantity 
Xia (Type 092) SSBN 1 
Golf' SSB 1 
Han SSN 5 
Song (Type 039) SSK 3 
‘Kilo’ (Type 877EKM) SSK 4 
`Ming' (Type 035) SS 17 
`Romeo' (Type 033) SS 32 
Key 
SSBN - Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine. 
SSB - Ballistic Missile Submarine. 
SSN - Nuclear Attack Submarine. 
SSK - Diesel-Electric Attack Submarine. 
SS - Attack Submarine. 
SSG - Guided Missile Submarine. 
Source: Jane's Defense Sentinel Security Assessment-China and Northeast Asia-12 
1.13.12 Inventory: Submarines 
 
 
APPENDIX E. CHINA’S NAVAL AIR FORCE ASSETS 
Type Role Quantity 
Xian H-6/H-6 III Bomber   30 
Harbin H-5 Bomber 100 
Nanchang Q-5 Attack 100 
Shenyang J-6/JJ-6 Air Defence/Attack 250 
Chengdu/Guizhou J-7 I/II/III Air Defence/Attack 100 
Shaanxi Y-8 Airborne Early Warning     6(1) 
Harbin SH-5 Maritime Patrol     4 
Beriev Be-6 `Madge' ASW Flying-Boat   12 
Xian Y-7 Transport   10 
Shijiazhuang Y-5 Utility   40 
Shenyang J-5A Lead-In Trainer   50 
Aerospatiale SA 321G/Zhi-
8 Super Frelon 
ASW Helicopter    6 
Sud SA 321J Super 
Frelon/Changhe Z-8 
ASW Helicopter 8/12 
Harbin Zhi-9A ASW Helicopter    10 
Kamov Ka 28 `Helix-A' ASW Helicopter    12(1) 
Source: Jane's Defense Sentinel Security Assessment-China and Northeast Asia-12 
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